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We examine the effects of the introduction of Vietnam’s health insurance (VHI) program on health outcomes, health 
care utilization, and nonmedical household consumption.   The use of panel data collected before and after the 
insurance program’s introduction allows us to eliminate any confounding effects due to selection on time-invariant 
unobservables, and our coupling of propensity score matching with a double-difference estimator allows us to reduce 
the risk of biases due to inappropriate specification of the outcome regression model.  Our results suggest that 
Vietnam’s health insurance program impacted favorably on height-for-age and weight-for-age of young school 
children, and on body mass index among adults.  Our results suggest that among young children, VHI increases use 
of primary care facilities, and leads to a substitution away from the use of pharmacists as a source of advice and 
non-prescribed medicines toward the use of them as a supplier of medicines prescribed by a health professional.  
Among older children and adults, VHI results in a marked increase in the use of hospital inpatient and outpatient 
departments.  Our results also suggest that VHI causes a reduction in annual out-of-pocket expenditures on health, 
and an increase in nonmedical household consumption, including food consumption but mostly non-food 
consumption.  Our estimate of the VHI-induced reduction in out-of-pocket health spending is considerably smaller 
than our estimate of the VHI-induced increase in nonmedical consumption, which is consistent with the idea that 
households hold back their household consumption considerably if, through lack of health insurance, they are 
exposed to the risk of large out-of-pocket expenditures.  This is especially plausible in a country where at the time 
(1993), a single visit to a public hospital cost on average the equivalent of 20% of a person’s annual non-food 
consumption.   
Keywords: Health insurance; impact evaluation.   
JEL codes: I1, O1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Policy toward health insurance requires striking a balance between the benefits insurance 
brings and the costs and inefficiencies involved (cf. e.g. Arrow 1963, Feldstein 1973, Manning 
and Marquis 1996).  Until recently, most of the empirical literature on health insurance was 
focused on the latter, and in particular on the market inefficiencies arising from information 
asymmetries between the insured and insurer, especially the issue of moral hazard.  Recently, the 
literature has shifted focus somewhat toward the benefits of health insurance, and has had some 
second thoughts about the methods used hitherto to investigate moral hazard.   
Several recent studies investigate the benefits of health insurance in terms of improved 
health outcomes.
1  These include three recent studies of the expansion of Medicaid in the US, 
exploiting for identification purposes the fact that some states expanded eligibility more than 
others did and at different times (Currie and Gruber 1996b, Currie and Gruber 1996a, Currie and 
Gruber 1997).     Currie and Gruber (1996a) find that Medicaid expansion significantly increased 
use of services among children and significantly reduced child mortality.  Significant effects on 
low birthweight and infant mortality were found in another paper (Currie and Gruber 1996b), 
while in their third paper Currie and Gruber (1997) found that impacts on infant mortality were 
larger for mothers and infants living close to high-tech hospitals.  Hanratty (1996) reports 
significant impacts on infant mortality of Canada’s health insurance program, the analysis again 
taking advantage of variations in the date of adoption of health insurance across geographic units 
(in this case provinces).   
In addition to the benefits in terms of better health, several other studies examine the 
issue of how far health insurance, through reducing uncertainty, enables households to reduce 
precautionary savings and labor supply.  Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find that Medicaid in the 
US led to a reduction in savings and an increase in consumption.  Chou et al. (2003) find that the 
introduction of National Health Insurance (NHI) in Taiwan led to a reduction in precautionary 
savings and to an increase in consumption, while Chou and Staiger (2001) found Taiwan’s NHI 
led to a reduction in female labor force participation.  The welfare implications of such findings 
are, of course, not straightforward: the case needs to be made—though it is surely a plausible 
one—that informal insurance devices, such as precautionary savings and diversification in 
household labor supply choices, are less efficient than formal health insurance.   
In a largely parallel literature, reservations have been expressed (cf. e.g. Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 2000, Vera-Hernandez 2003) about the tendency in the literature to equate moral 
hazard to the effect of insurance on medical care utilization.
2  Moral hazard, it noted, reflects an 
information asymmetry between the insured and insurer, and the fact that the parties cannot 
contract over an unobserved variable.  To the extent that the insurer can infer the value of the 
unobservable variable from observable contractible variables, the problem of moral hazard 
diminishes, and at the limit disappears altogether.  The degree to which this happens is 
independent of the elasticity of use with respect to insurance coverage.  Indeed, the increased 
                                                 
1  See Levy and Meltzer (2001) for a very useful review of this literature.   
2  Examples of recent studies in this genre include Waters (1999), Harmon and Nolan (2001), Sapelli and Vial (2003), Trujillo 
(2003), Jowett et al. (2003) and Savage and Wright (Jowett et al. 2003).      2
utilization that greater coverage permits is one of the factors that motivates health insurance, and 
is likely to account for a potentially large fraction of the welfare gain associated with it (cf. 
Nyman 1999).  Insurance affords the prospect of receiving treatment that would have been 
beyond the feasible set in the absence of insurance.  Further, linked to the other strand of 
literature discussed above, insurance reduces uncertainty and produces a wealth effect, which is 
likely to translate into higher levels of medical care use irrespective of whether there is any 
moral hazard at work (cf. de Meza 1983).   
If the risk-reduction attributable to health insurance is associated with wealth effects in 
medical care utilization, it is also likely to be associated with wealth effects in the consumption 
of other commodities, some of which may be beneficial to health.  If a household knows that by 
acquiring health insurance it has reduced its exposure to the risk of large out-of-pocket health 
expenses, it is likely to ‘spend’ some of this extra wealth on food, shelter, clothes, housing, 
education and other items of the household budget.  In poor households, this extra spending may 
well be one of the channels by which health insurance leads to better health outcomes.  Evidence 
from rural China, where health insurance coverage dropped dramatically following the 
decollectivization of agriculture, suggests that the risk associated with medical expenses does 
indeed influence a variety of household decisions, including the amount of wealth households 
hold, the share of wealth they hold in liquid form, the extent of temporary migration and school 
enrollment (Jalan and Ravallion 2001).   
This paper estimates the impacts of health insurance on health outcomes, and on other 
variables some of which may conceivably impact on health outcomes, such as the use of medical 
care, food consumption, spending on water, and the use value associated with household 
durables.  The setting is Vietnam in the 1990s.  Vietnam’s social health insurance program, or 
Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI) as it was known at the time, was set up in 1993 in response to a 
growing concern over the scale of out-of-pocket payments for health.  In 1993, over 70% of 
health spending in Vietnam was paid out-of-pocket, and out-of-pocket payments absorbed 6% of 
the average household’s total consumption (World Bank et al. 2001, Wagstaff 2002).  As many 
as 18% of households spent more than 10% of their total consumption on health care, and as 
many as 47% of households spent more than 10% of their non-food consumption on health care 
(Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003).  In 1993, a single visit to a public hospital by someone from 
the bottom quintile cost the equivalent of 41% of their annual non-food consumption (World 
Bank et al. 2001).  Unsurprisingly, health care payments were a major source of concern among 
Vietnamese participants in the global participatory poverty study Voices of the Poor (Narayan et 
al. 2000).   
Given this background, and given its very generous initial coverage (copayments were 
introduced only in late 1998), VHI can reasonably be expected to have had effects on both 
medical care use and on the consumption of other budget items, with likely consequences for 
health outcomes.  We estimate insurance impacts through the use of propensity score matching 
(PSM) on longitudinal data collected just before the introduction of VHI in 1992/93 and five 
years later in 1997/98.
3  Two-thirds of those joining VHI in this period—and 95% of adults 
                                                 
3  The use of PSM and longitudinal data are two features that distinguish the present study from that of Trivedi (2003), who used 
regression analysis on the 1997/98 cross-section data.  The present study also looks beyond health care use and health care 
spending.  There are also differences in variable definitions that further make comparisons rather difficult.  For example, Trivedi 
defines annual health spending as the sum of spending in the last 4 weeks and spending in the last 12 months, whereas we treat 
them as two separate variables, assuming that one measures spending in the last month and the other spending in the last year.     3
joining the scheme—were compulsorily enrolled by virtue of their employment with the 
government or a state-owned enterprise, or being a pensioner or a ‘person of merit’ (such as a 
war veteran).  The bulk (95%) of those voluntarily enrolled were school children, whose schools 
are encouraged to enroll their pupils by the local Communist party.  While there appears to have 
been very little self-selection into the scheme during this period, there is the possibility that those 
selected into the scheme share unobservable attributes that make them healthier (or heavier users 
of health care) than those not selected.  The pre-post longitudinal data allow us to replace the 
standard PSM assumption—that outcomes are independent of participation given the values of 
the relevant pre-intervention control variables—by a weaker assumption, namely that changes in 
outcomes are independent of participation given the pre-intervention controls (cf. Blundell and 
Costa Dias 2000).  We are thus able to eliminate any bias due to time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity, in addition to bias due to observable heterogeneity which PSM on cross-section 
data already eliminates (cf. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997, Heckman et al. 1998, Jalan and 
Ravallion 2003a).  We are, however, forced to assume that any unobserved time trend in our 
outcomes is the same for the insured and uninsured.  Only randomization can completely rule out 
such a possibility, which in principle is a concern even in studies that exploit differences in speed 
of adoption across geographic units.  The attraction of PSM over a regression analysis is that we 
do not need to specify any model for our outcomes and hence reduce the risk of biases due to 
inappropriate model specification, whether in the functional form or the covariates included.  We 
do have to do some modeling, namely in the prediction of propensity scores—the probability of 
being enrolled in VHI.   
Section II outlines the salient features of Vietnam’s health insurance program.  Section III 
sets out our estimation method, based on a combination of propensity score matching and double 
differencing on pre-intervention and post-intervention data.  Section IV outlines the model used 
to generate our propensity scores, and compares the distributions of the propensity scores of the 
insured and uninsured pre- and post-matching.   Sections V-VIII contain our results for health 
outcomes, health utilization, out-of-pocket expenditures and nonmedical consumption, 
respectively.  Section IX contains our conclusions.   
II. VIETNAM’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 
Prior to the Doi Moi (or ‘renovation’) reforms of the late 1980s, health services in 
Vietnam were provided at the taxpayer’s expense, with patients paying only the cost of drugs 
(Bloom 1998).  The decollectivization of agriculture and the liberalization of the economy led to 
a swift erosion of the government’s role in financing health care in Vietnam.  Following changes 
in 1989 government facilities were allowed to charge fees, and in 1991 legislation was passed 
that paved the way for a private health sector (Bloom 1998, Glewwe 2003).  The share of the 
cost of health care borne directly by households is likely to have increased considerably 
following these reforms.  This prompted concerns about the affordability of health care, 
especially among the poor, which in 1993 still accounted for 58% of the population (Glewwe 
2003).  Subsequent analysis of data from the 1993 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) 
bore these concerns out: a single visit in 1993 to a public hospital by someone from the bottom 
quintile would have cost the equivalent of 41% of their annual non-food consumption (World 
Bank et al. 2001).  Even for the population as a whole, the figure was close to 20%.     4
It was against this background that in 1993 the government introduced a health insurance 
scheme, known initially as Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI).  Civil servants, state enterprise 
workers, the military, Communist party officials and pensioners who were previously in one of 
these government jobs were (and continue to be) covered, and private firms with more than 10 
employees were (and still are) required to enroll their workers.  Table 1 gives a breakdown 
across the categories for 1998, the first year for which a full breakdown is possible.  The 
contribution for compulsory workers is split between the worker and the employer, and the 
coverage is generous: the fees for inpatient and outpatient care are covered, as are the costs of 
drugs used in inpatient care (World Bank et al. 2001); prior to 1998 (the year of the follow-up 
survey used in the analysis below), no copayments were required.  A voluntary component of the 
VHI program also exists, aimed at the rest of the population.  However, in practice the scheme 
has succeeded only in enrolling students, who account for 92% of the voluntarily insured (see 
Table 1).  Schools are pressured by local governments to enroll their students, and the schools in 
turn pressure parents, who pay the contribution (World Bank et al. 2001).  The proportion of 
students covered varies considerably across provinces (Government of Vietnam 2002b), 
presumably reflecting the varying pressure applied by different local governments.  Coverage is 
much less generous for the voluntarily enrolled, including typically only inpatient benefits.   
However, students who are enrolled in VHI can obtain care at a school clinic which VHI helps 
large schools establish.   
 
Table 1: Breakdown of insureds in Vietnam’s health insurance (VHI) scheme, 1998 
 
  # people  % population% insureds% group 
Population 77,046,000     
VHI insureds   9,758,015 12.7%   
  of which         
  Compulsory  6,069,309 7.9% 62.2% 
  of which         
    Civil servants  1,367,768    22.5% 
    State enterprises  1,561,710    25.7% 
    Private enterprises  310,757    5.1% 
    Pensioners  1,179,102    19.4% 
    People of merit  1,212,048    20.0% 
    Commune administration staff 37,924   0.6% 
  Voluntary  3,688,706 4.8% 37.8% 
  of which       
    Students  3,402,328    92.2% 
Source: Government of Vietnam (2002a).   
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III. METHODS 
In the panel dataset we use—the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS)
4—we 
observe most of the outcomes of interest during the first wave (fielded in 1992/93 just before the 
introduction of VHI), and again in the second wave (fielded in 1997/98).  In what follows, t=1 
denotes 1992/93 and t=2 denotes 1997/98.   
Let yit be the outcome of interest for individual i at time t.  In our empirical analysis y 
alternates between health status, out-of-pocket payments, nonmedical consumption and 
utilization of health services.  We assume that the change in yit between 1993 and 1998 in the 
case of the “treated” group (i.e. those enrolled in VHI after it was introduced) can be written
5:   
(1)  it t it it
T
it G y y ε θ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆
* ,  
where ∆ denotes the change between 1993 and 1998, 
*
it y  is the counterfactual outcome for VHI 
enrollees, Git is the “gain” or impact of the program, θt is unobserved and specific to period t, εit 
is a white noise measurement error term associated with the outcome variable, and N is the 
number of individuals who were enrolled in VHI in period 2.  For each participant (i.e. insured), 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) to identify a matched non-participant (cf. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983).
6  This involves estimating regression (e.g. probit) equations for the 
participation decision, and defining a nearest neighbor for each participant as the non-participant 
with the closest propensity score (predicted participation probability).  We assume that for the N 
matched controls we can write: 
(2)  it t it
M
it u y y ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ θ
* ,  
where  uit is a white-noise error term.  Subtracting eqn (2) from eqn (1) gives the double-
difference or difference-in-differences:  




it u G y y ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − ∆ ε , 
which, given Gi1=0 (the program did not exist at t=1), can be rewritten: 




it u G y y ∆ − ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ ε 2 . 
Taking expectations of eqn (3’) gives 




it G E y y E = ∆ − ∆ , 
given ε and u are assumed to have zero mean.   
                                                 
4  Further details on the survey can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/.   
5  The notation and exposition in this section borrows heavily from Ravallion et al. (2003).   
6  Crystal clear expositions of PSM with economic applications are to be found in Jalan and Ravallion (2003a, 2003b).  Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2000) provide a useful survey of evaluation methods, and show how PSM relates to other methods.  Applications 
of PSM in the health sector include Newman et al. (2002), Pradhan and Rawlings (2002), Sadaah et al. (2001) and Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003a).     6
Eqns (1) and (2) assume that conditional on the propensity score, participation in the 
insurance program is independent of the change in outcome between the year before the program 
was introduced and the date of the second wave of the survey, five years later.  Eqns (1) and (2) 
are compatible with individual-specific time-invariant unobservables, so that our estimates will 
not be contaminated by any selection on time-invariant unobservables.  We have also allowed for 
a common unobservable growth component in the outcome growth equations.  Under our 
assumptions, the only driver of differential change between the insured and matched uninsureds 
is the fact that the former are insured and the latter are not.  The risk we run is that the 
unobserved time trends are not—contrary to what we assume—independent of insurance status.  
If the insured have a more favorable time trend than the uninsured, we will end up attributing 
differences in changes in y to insurance when they are, in fact, attributable—at least in part—to 
different unobserved time trends.   
The link with standard exogeneity assumptions and the attractions of the matching 
approach can be seen as follows (cf. Imbens 2004).  Suppose one were prepared to assume that 
the treatment effect is constant, and that the outcome among the uninsured is linear in Xi.  With 
cross-section data one could try to recover the treatment effect from a regression of the outcome 
on an insurance status dummy (I) and the vector Xi:   
(5)  i i i i X I y ε β τ α + + + = . 
Estimation might proceed on the assumption that I is exogenous in the sense that conditional on 
X, I and ε are uncorrelated, which is the regression equivalent of the ‘unconfoundedness’ or 
‘ignorable treatment assignment’ assumption made in the treatment effects literature when cross-
section data are used.  Or one might use a Heckman selection model and rely either on functional 
form or exclusion restrictions to identify the insurance effect.  Both have been used in the 
insurance literature, but neither is altogether satisfactory.
7   
In the present context, with a two-wave panel conducted before and after the insurance 
scheme was introduced, we are able to make a much weaker exogeniety assumption (cf. Blundell 
and Costa Dias 2000).  Instead of (5), the regression analogue of what we have is: 
(6)  1 1 1 1 i i i i X y ε µ θ β α + + + + = , 
and 
(7)  2 2 2 2 2 i i i i i X I y ε µ θ β τ α + + + + + = , 
so that if ∆ denotes the difference between period t=1 and t=2, we get 
                                                 
7  Studies relying on the non-linearity of the Heckman model to secure identification include the studies of Waters (1999) and 
Jowett et al. (2003).  A number of studies explore exclusion restrictions to identify the effects of insurance in a cross-section 
context.  Gertler and Strum (1997) consider various possibilities, but in the end conclude they have no plausible instruments.  
Harmon and Nolan (2001) exclude education from the utilization equation, which they acknowledge is problematic, and resort to 
non-linearity as the alternative identification strategy.  Guariglia and Rossi (2004) in their analysis of the impact of health 
insurance on savings in the UK use as identifying instruments occupation, workplace size, whether the individual has an 
occupational pension, and whether he or she works in the private sector.  It is not at all obvious why any of these ought to be 
excluded from the savings equation.     7
(8)  it t it i it X I y ε θ β τ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 2 .   
Our exogeneity assumption is equivalent in a regression context to assuming that, conditional on 
Xit (or rather its change), I is independent of ∆θt and ∆εit.  This leaves open the possibility that 
the time-invariant individual-specific unobservable, µi, is correlated with I, conditional on ∆X—
i.e. that there is selection on time-invariant unobservables.  The main risk being run is that it may 
not be the case that, conditional on the covariates, the period-specific unobservable, θ, grows by 
the same amount for the insured and uninsured.  This is a risk one will always run outside a 
randomized experiment.  Whenever insurance cover is provided to or withdrawn from some 
people before others, there is always the possibility—unless the assignment is random—that, 
conditional on ∆X, ∆θt and I are correlated.   
The estimation approach has various attractions.  In contrast to the regression approach, it 
does not require the specification of a model—let alone a parametric one—for our outcome 
variable.  We do need to estimate a regression model to capture the enrollment decision, but in 
the case of VHI this is relatively straightforward especially for the compulsorily enrolled.   
IV. ESTIMATION OF PROPENSITY SCORES  
Our first task is the estimation of the propensity scores which provide us with a basis for 
matching each enrolled individual with a suitable comparator from the non-enrolled subsample.  
For this we require an insurance coverage variable, as well as variables measured in 1992-93 that 
influence insurance enrollment.   
The VLSS health module asks respondents whether they have insurance coverage.   
Workers are asked again in the main job module whether they receive health benefits from their 
employer and if so whether this takes the form of health insurance.  In what follows, we classify 
an individual as insured with VHI if they answer Yes to either module’s question.
8  VHI 
coverage is estimated at around 17% for the sample as a whole (Table 2), somewhat higher than 
the official VHI figures for 1998.  This discrepancy may be because some VLSS respondents 
with health insurance are insured with an organization other than VHI, the obvious one being 
Bao Viet, the insurance arm of Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance, which provides insurance for 
shipping and heavy industry, but which also provides health insurance, mainly to school 
children.  VHI coverage ranges from 27% in the richest consumption quintile to under 10% in 
the poorest, though there is considerable variation within each quintile.  Coverage (in 1997/98) 
also varies with age (Figure 2), being relative high among those who were in the 6-15 age group 
in 1997/98, then dipping and picking up again among those in the 45-70 age group in 1997/98.   
                                                 
8  An unsuccessful attempt was made to construct separate variables for compulsory and voluntary coverage within VHI.     8
Table 2: VHI coverage by consumption quintile 
Quintile   Mean Std. Dev. # cases
 
1 0.0911 0.2878 3656
2 0.1225 0.3279 3754
3 0.1690 0.3748 3586
4 0.2041 0.4031 3473
5 0.2709 0.4445 3355
Total 0.1693 0.3750 17824
 
Source: VLSS data.   
































Source: VLSS data.   
On the face of it, VHI enrollment ought to be almost perfectly predictable on the basis of 
employer type, pensioner status and schooling status.  In the event,  our probit enrollment 
equation (Table 3) gives a pseudo R-squared of only 0.19, pointing to considerable variation 
across similar individuals in the probability of being enrolled.  As expected, being in school 
(around 25% of our sample is currently in school) has a significant positive effect on VHI 
enrollment.  Age has no significant effect on enrollment, once being in school and pensioner 
status are controlled for.  Unsurprisingly, too, a person’s job has a marked impact on insurance 
status.  The equation includes the employer of individuals with one or more formal sector jobs in 
the week prior to the VLSS interview.  The omitted category from the employer dummies is “no 
employer”.  Very few individuals in the sample have formal sector jobs and even fewer have 
jobs in organizations providing VHI coverage under the compulsory scheme.  As expected, the 
enrollment probability is higher for individuals having a job in the communist party, government 
or army, as well as for those having a main job in a state enterprise, social organization or a 
cooperative.   Those with a main or second job in the private sector are significantly less likely to 
be enrolled in VHI.  Being a pensioner increases the probability of enrollment.     9
A variety of household-level variables are also included.  The probability of enrollment 
increases with per capita household income.  Enrollment is significantly higher among people 
living in a household where the head of household had completed at least lower secondary 
education.  Enrollment increases with grade completed above this level.   
Rather than including community-level variables per se, the enrollment equation includes 
fixed effects measured at the province level.  This gets round two problems associated with the 
VLSS community-level data.  First, they were collected only in rural and peri-urban areas.   
Second, like all community-level data, they may well miss out some potentially important 
community-level influences on the enrollment decision.  For example, Behrman and Knowles 
(1999) find the premium to be a factor influencing enrollment by students in VHI.  It is known 
that the premium for voluntary enrollment varies geographically in Vietnam (World Bank et al. 
2001), but the VLSS provides no information on this variation.  Similarly, Jowett (2003) finds 
that informal risk-sharing networks influence the uptake of VHI, but the VLSS provides no 
information on their existence.  The province-level fixed effects vary considerably, the null 
hypothesis of common effects being decisively rejected.   
Table 3: Enrollment propensity score estimation results 
Covariate Mean  Std  Dev.  Coef.  z-statistic
        
Primary school  0.234  0.423  0.0441  0.84 
Lower secondary school  0.472  0.499  0.2442  5.00 
Upper seconday school  0.089  0.284  0.3209  5.42 
Post-secondary school  0.094  0.292  0.7058  12.21 
Age in years  25.373  19.905  0.0008  0.96 
Currently in school  0.254  0.435  0.4098  12.89 
Employer in main job is communist party, government or army  0.016  0.126  1.7935  19.55 
Employer in main job is social organization  0.002  0.044  1.7481  7.04 
Employer in main job is state-owned company  0.013  0.113  1.3885  14.82 
Employer in main job is joint venture with foreign partner  0.000  0.021  0.2520  0.42 
Employer in main job is cooperative  0.006  0.075  0.4152  2.98 
Employer in main job is private company or household  0.049  0.215  -0.4517  -5.90 
Employer in second job is communist party, government or army  0.002  0.043  0.8068  3.12 
Employer in second job is social organization  0.000  0.011  -0.3994  -0.27 
Employer in second job is state-owned company  0.000  0.018  0.3002  0.49 
Employer in second job is cooperative  0.002  0.050  0.0043  0.02 
Employer in second job is private company or household  0.009  0.096  -0.5056  -3.11 
Pensioner 0.032  0.176  0.5197  7.50 
Per capita household income  1914  2725  0.0000  3.14 
        
Note: Chi squared for province fixed effects: 1140 with 72 df.   
Figure 1 and Table 4 provide some descriptive statistics of the propensity scores.  Prior to 
matching the distributions of the insured and uninsured differed markedly with respect to the 
estimated propensity score.
9  Table 4 shows that contrary to the impression given by Figure 1, 
                                                 
9  The distributions shown here are for the sample used in the analysis of the impact of VHI on the probability of being inpatient 
during the previous 12 months.     10
there are some uninsured with propensity scores larger than 0.75.  After nearest-neighbor 
matching (NNM), the distributions look markedly similar.   The difference can be reduced still 
further (Table 4) by imposing a 0.001 ‘caliper’ (requiring that the squared difference in predicted 
odds ratios between the nearest neighbors be smaller than 0.001) and imposition of a common 
support (dropping insured individuals whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum score of the matched uninsured).  But in so doing, 214 cases are lost, and 
the results—unsurprisingly given how similar the distributions are after NNM—turned out to be 
not markedly different.  The results that follow are based on simple NNM.   
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Table 4: Distributions of propensity scores before and after matching 
   #  cases  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Before  matching  Uninsured  14795 0.135738 0.124385 0.000453  0.988689 
  Insured  3014  0.332719 0.233047 0.004923  0.996576 
           
After nearest neighbor matching  Uninsured  3011  0.331963  0.231969  0.004934  0.988689 
  Insured    3011  0.332058 0.232220 0.004923  0.988621 
           
After matching on common support   Uninsured    2797  0.295473  0.194748  0.004934  0.988689 
and with 0.001 caliper  Insured   2797  0.295474  0.194748  0.004923  0.988621 
           
V. HEALTH OUTCOMES 
We measure health outcomes through anthropometry, there being no data in the VLSS on 
activities of daily living or self-assessed health.  The VLSS is unusual among living standards 
measurement surveys in recording the height and weight for everyone in the sample, not just 
children under the age of five (Alderman 2000).  Furthermore, anthropometric measurements 
were taken for the full sample in both waves of the VLSS.   
For children, we use z-scores for both height-for-age (HAZ) and weight-for age (WAZ).
10  
Higher z-scores indicate improved nutritional status, and children with values below –2 (i.e. less 
than two standard deviations below the mean of the reference group) are by convention classified 
as “underweight” (WAZ) or “stunted” (HAZ).  We present results for three age groups: children 
aged between zero and 4 inclusive in 1992/93 and therefore between 5 and 9 at the time of the 
second wave; children aged between 5 and 23 in 1992/93; and all children between the ages of 
zero and 23 in 1992/93.  In the second and third cases, in addition to matching on the propensity 
score, we match on the child’s age bracket (the brackets being in five-yearly intervals).
11   
Table 5 shows the results.
12  VHI produces a significant effect on the height and weight 
of young children (children aged between 0 and 4 in 1992/93) but not of older children.  In the 
case of weight-for-age but not height-for-age, the effect rises with per capita household 
consumption; indeed, there is no evidence of any beneficial effect of VHI on weight-for-age 
among the poorest quintile.   
                                                 
10  We standardize the anthropometric data using the 1990 British growth reference data (Cole, Freeman and Preece 1998) which 
are available for newborns up to the age of 23.  A convenient Stata routine http://www.stata-journal.com/software/sj4-
1/dm0004/zanthro.hlp: is available to undertake these and the more familiar US reference standardizations (Kuczmarski et al. 
2000).  The latter are available for young people only up to the age of 20.   
11  Similar results were obtained when we matched on the propensity score and restricted matches to the same age group.   
12 The treatment effects reported throughout are the average treatment on the treated.  The standard errors underlying the z-
statistics were computed treating propensity score as fixed using the Stata add-in ‘nnmatch’, and requesting the standard error 
relevant to the population rather than the sample.  The reported z-statistics tend to be marginally larger than those obtained via 
bootstrapping with the Stata add-in ‘psmatch2’.  This allows for the fact that the propensity score is itself subject to sampling 
variability but adds substantially to computation time.  The F-tests for the constancy of treatment effects across per capita 
consumption quintiles are obtained from regressions of estimated treatment effects on consumption quintile dummies.  The 
regressions are estimated on a sample comprising insured individuals and matched uninsured individuals.  The latter weighted by 
the number of times they are used as a match for an insured individual.  Quintile-specific treatment effects and their standard 
errors are obtained from this regression.     12











quintile differences  Prob > F 
           
Height-for-age 0-23  all  0.154  3.34     
  0-4  all  0.456  4.06  F(4, 414) = 0.80  0.527 
  5-23  all  0.031  0.69  F(4, 1029) = 0.51  0.727 
           
Weight-for-age 0-23  all  0.113 2.58     
  0-4  all  0.332  3.57  F(4, 416) = 3.70  0.006 
 0-4  1  -0.115  -0.61     
 0-4  2  0.293  1.69     
 0-4  3  0.236  1.42     
 0-4  4  0.348  2.03     
 0-4  5  0.869  4.82     
  5-23  all  0.023  0.49  F(4, 1027) = 0.84  0.499 
           
The impacts for under-five children are statistically significant, but are they large enough 
to matter?  The estimated treatment effects translate into increases in height and weight of 2.35 
cm and 0.75 kg respectively, equivalent to increases on the counterfactual 1997/98 height and 
weight respectively of 2% and 4%.  Assuming the effects occurred continuously throughout the 
five years following the 1992/93 survey, these effects are equivalent to an extra 0.47 cm extra 
height and 0.15 kg extra weight per year.  To express the effects another way, the annualized 
VHI impacts are equivalent to 7% and 9% of counterfactual annual growth of height and weight, 
while the total cumulative impacts are equivalent to 37% and 46% of annual growth of height 
and weight .
13   
How do these impacts compare to those reported for other programs?  Behrman and 
Hoddinott (2000) estimate that young children within Mexico’s PROGRESA program grew by 
an additional centimeter in the year following the program’s introduction, equivalent to 17% of 
the counterfactual mean growth per year, a little over twice that achieved by VHI.  Case (2002) 
estimates that five years after its introduction South Africa’s pension scheme had caused a 3-4 
cm increase in height among Colored and Black children aged 0-6.  This (cumulative) impact 
was equivalent to 44% of a year’s growth, a little more than VHI’s cumulative impact after a 
similar period of 37%.   South Africa’s pension is estimated to have increased weight among 
young children as well, but only among Colored children.  The estimated 1 kg cumulative impact 
for this group is a little larger than the 0.75 kg VHI estimated cumulative impact.  Chaudhuri 
(2003) has estimated that Bangladesh’s maternal and child health program increased heights and 
weights of children under the age of 14 by 0.07 and 0.06 standard deviations respectively.   
Mackintosh et al. (2002) estimate that a Save-the Children integrated nutrition project in northern 
Vietnam increased weight-for-age by 0.63 standard deviations, but had no effect on height-for-
age.  Of course, a fully-fledged comparison across these programs would want to take into 
                                                 
13 Among the uninsured, the annual change in height and weight among under-five children between 1992/93 and 1997/98 was 
6.4 cm and 1.6 kg.     13
account the costs and the other achievements of the programs.  With the exception of the Save-
the-Children project, the programs are geared toward achieving goals beyond the improvement 
of the nutritional status of young children, and their budgets reflect this.  In 1999, Mexico spent 
0.2% of its GDP on PROGRESA
14, and in 1995/96 South Africa spent 1.5% of its GDP on its 
old-age pension program (Alderman 1999).  Vietnam also spent around 0.2% of its GDP on VHI 
in 1998, though only 10% of the budget was associated with revenues in respect of the 
voluntarily enrolled (Government of Vietnam 2002a).   
For adults (defined here as people aged 18 or over in 1992-93), we measure health or 
nutritional status using the body mass index (BMI), defined as equal to a person’s weight in 
kilograms divided by their height in square meters.  A person with a BMI score below 18.5 is 
considered ‘underweight’, while someone with a BMI score in the range 18.5-24.9 is considered 
‘normal’.  Someone with a BMI score in the range 25-29.9 is considered to be ‘overweight’, and 
someone with a score higher than 30 is considered obese.  In Vietnam in the survey period, less 
than 1% of the sample in either year was classified as overweight or obese, while roughly one 
quarter of the sample were classified as underweight.   While primarily a measure of nutritional 
status, BMI has been found to be a good predictor of mortality (Calle et al. 1999).   Recent 
research has shown that leanness—a BMI score in the ‘underweight’ range—increases the risk of 
death from a number of causes.
15   
The results in Table 6 suggest that VHI had a significant impact the BMI of adults.  The 
impact rises monotonically with per capita household consumption, and as with weight-for-age 
among young children, there is no evidence of any beneficial effect of VHI on nutritional status 
among the poorest quintile (indeed there is a statistically significant negative estimated treatment 
effect).  The estimated treatment effect of 0.303 is equal to 1.5% of the average 1998 BMI score 
of the matched uninsured group.  Unfortunately it is not possible to say whether this is large or 
small relative to other programs.  While BMI has been used extensively in the medical literature, 
it has not been widely used in the economics literature
16 and not at all apparently in the 
evaluation of programs.   
                                                 
14  See http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm.   
15  A number of recent studies have concluded as much (see e.g. Kark et al. 1995, Seidell et al. 1996, Yuan et al. 1998, Gilmore 
1999, Franceschi et al. 2001, Gallus et al. 2001, Marret et al. 2001, Qian, Guo and Zhang 2001, Muller et al. 2003, Thorogood et 
al. 2003, Zhang et al. 2003, Inoue, Sobue and Tsugane 2004).   
16  The studies to date have typically used BMI as a measure of adult nutrition as a factor influencing child nutrition (Alderman 
2000).     14










quintile differences  Prob > F 
         
18+  all  0.303  2.91  F(4, 1358) = 6.18  0.000 
18+ 1  -0.425  -2.02     
18+ 2  0.049  0.26     
18+ 3  0.302  2.09     
18+ 4  0.168  1.31     
18+ 5  0.617  6.15     
         
VI. HEALTH SERVICE UTILIZATION 
An obvious channel through which VHI impacts on nutritional status is increased use of 
health care.  Using the VLSS panel to investigate this possibility is not straightforward because 
the wording of the health utilization questions changed significantly from one wave to the next.  
We adopt two approaches: in the first, we use the panel and do the best with what is available; in 
the second, we focus on the 1998 wave and estimate VHI impacts via single-difference matching 
(i.e. comparing levels of utilization of the insured and matched uninsured, rather than changes in 
them).   
In the 1992/93 VLSS, respondents who reported illness or injury during the previous 4 
weeks were then asked whether a contact with any health service provider had occurred during 
the same period.  Examples of different types of provider were read out, but they were simply 
examples.  Respondents were then asked who the first contact was with, but they were not asked 
whether there were any further contacts with the same provider or with any other provider.  In 
the second wave, all respondents—whether or not they had reported any recent sickness in a 
preceding question—were taken through a closed list of different types of provider, and asked in 
each case whether a contact had occurred in the previous 4 weeks, and if so how many times the 
provider in question had been consulted.  The different approaches in the two years make 
comparisons across years difficult, but what can be done is to construct a variable in both waves 
indicating whether someone reporting sickness made a contact with any provider (World Bank et 
al. 2001).   
The results in Table 7 suggest that VHI increased the probability of a sick person 
contacting a provider among the sample as a whole and for individuals aged five and over, but 
not for children under the age of five.  These results are of course limited by the limited 
usefulness of the utilization variable.  It does not capture the number of visits, simply the 
probability.  It excludes preventive visits, quite possibly a route via which VHI coverage 
translates into better outcomes for younger children.  And there is the possibility that in 1997/98 
some visits were inadvertently omitted  because of the closed list of provider types.  The list is 
extensive, but it does not include explicitly any visits to a school clinic.  Given the fact that VHI   15
has helped establish such school clinics, and given the apparent effects that VHI has had on 
anthropometric measures of health status among younger children, this is a cause for concern.   




effects  z-stat 
F-test consumption 
quintile differences  Prob > F 
       
0-4  0.0389  0.95  F(4, 432) =    2.28  0.060 
5+ 0.0473  3.41     
All 0.0433  3.38     
       
We can get richer utilization information by focusing on the 1997-98 survey.  In so 
doing, we are forced to use the single-difference matching estimator, and are therefore unable to 
eliminate any biases introduced by selection on time-invariant unobservables as we were able to 
with the double-difference approach.  Table 8 reports results separately for under-fives and 
individuals over the age of five.  For both age groups, VHI appears to stimulate use of commune 
health centers (CHCs).  Among the under-fives, VHI appears also to encourage visits to 
pharmacists to obtain prescription medicines, and to reduce visits to pharmacists to obtain advice 
and non-prescribed medicines.  Among individuals aged five and over, but not among young 
children, VHI encourages the use of hospital care—including inpatient care—and to a much 
lesser extent the use of polyclinics.  With the exception of visits to CHCs, impacts do not differ 
significantly across the consumption distribution; VHI only has a significant impact on the use of 
CHCs among the poor.  These results are broadly similar to those reported by Trivedi (2003), 
though he did not report separate results for children and adults, or for the two different types of 
pharmacy visit.  He also found VHI increased utilization of CHC and hospital care, and 
decreased pharmacy visits overall.  However, unlike us, he found VHI caused substitution away 
from the private sector.     16
Table 8: Double-difference estimates of VHI impact on contact probability among sick 
Outcome 
Treatment 
effects  z-stat 
F-test consumption 
quintile differences  Prob > F 
       
Age 0-4 in 1992/93       
Hospital visits  0.0000  0.00  F(4, 432) = 0.60  0.66 
CHC visits  0.0297  1.73  F(4, 432) = 2.31  0.06 
Polyclinic visits  0.0000  0.00  F(4, 432) = 1.75  0.14 
Private provider visits  0.0115  0.36  F(4, 432) = 0.79  0.53 
Pharmacist visits for prescribed medicines   0.0252  1.81  F(4, 432) = 2.00  0.09 
Pharmacist visits for advice & nonprescribed medicines -0.2059  -1.69  F(4, 432) = 0.57  0.69 
Visit to traditional healer   0.0000  0.00  F(4, 432) = 0.44  0.78 
Total visits  -0.1830  -1.31  F(4, 432) = 0.56  0.69 
Inpatient spell during 1997/98  0.0160  0.93  F(4, 432) = 0.39  0.82 
       
Age 5+ in 1992/93       
Hospital visits  0.0753  6.54  F(4, 2572) = 1.01  0.40 
CHC visits  0.0211  2.13  F(4, 2572) = 5.27  0.00 
Polyclinic visits  0.0085  3.15  F(4, 2572) = 1.06  0.38 
Private provider visits  -0.0089  -0.35  F(4, 2572) = 0.83  0.51 
Pharmacist visits for prescribed medicines   -0.0008  -0.06  F(4, 2571) = 1.87  0.11 
Pharmacist visits for advice & nonprescribed medicines -0.0237  -0.61  F(4, 2571) = 0.20  0.94 
Visit to traditional healer   0.0008  0.12  F(4, 2572) = 0.38  0.82 
Total visits  0.0472  0.82  F(4, 2571) = 0.93  0.45 
Inpatient spell during 1997/98  0.0621  8.53  F(4, 2572) = 0.59  0.67 
       
These patterns do not seem inconsistent with the health status impacts of VHI.  Many key 
interventions for young children—including vaccinations, vitamin supplements as well as the 
giving of advice on nutrition, hygiene and other home-delivered interventions such as oral 
rehydration therapy—can easily be delivered in a primary care setting (Bryce et al. 2003, Jones 
et al. 2003).  Furthermore, Vietnam’s primary care providers scored well in a recent international 
study in terms of correctly diagnosing and treatment common childhood illnesses (World Health 
Organization 1998).  Medicines—especially antibiotics—have a role to play in treating 
pneumonia, dysentery and other childhood illnesses, and while “irrational” drug use is known to 
be a problem even among professional providers, it seems likely that this problem and the 
problem of counterfeit drugs is greater among drug vendors.  It therefore seems likely that in a 
country like Vietnam child health can only improve if mothers switch from using pharmacists as 
providers of advice to using them as suppliers of prescribed drugs.  The large impacts on hospital 
use among older children and adults also seem consistent with the health impacts earlier.  In the 
case of adults—in contrast to the case of young children—it seems likely that if the estimated 
BMI impacts derive from additional use of medical care, some additional use of hospital care 
would likely be involved.     17
VII. OUT-OF-POCKET PAYMENTS  
VHI need not necessarily cause out-of-pocket payments to fall.  If the demand for health 
care covered by VHI is especially elastic with respect to price, or if the demand for health care 
generally is especially sensitive to the reduction of risk and uncertainty, VHI could conceivably  
result in higher out-of-pocket payments.   
Both surveys contain estimates for the previous twelve months of cash and in-kind 
payments for health care.  These data are collected from all respondents, whether or not they had 
been ill in the previous 4 weeks.  In addition, the 1997/98 survey allows a reliable estimate to be 
made of out-of-pocket spending in the 4 weeks prior to the interview
17, and permits annual health 
spending to be broken down into inpatient and other health spending.  The numbers are in 
thousands of Vietnamese dong.  The double-difference estimate of annual out-of-pocket 
spending is negative and significant (Table 9), in contrast to the single-difference estimate for 4-
week and annual total out-of-pocket spending derived from the 1997/98 data alone.  The last two 
lines of Table 9 point to VHI increasing—albeit not significantly—inpatient care spending, and 
having a dampening effect on spending on other types of care.   




    
Double difference on longitudinal data    
Change in out-of-pocket spending between 1992/93 and 1997/98 -51.967  -2.52 
    
Single difference on 1997/98 data    
Out-of-pocket spending in last 4 weeks  -2.530  -0.27 
Out-of-pocket spending in 1997/98   -18.744  -0.96 
Inpatient expenditure in 1997/98   8.636  1.08 
Non-inpatient out-of-pocket spending 1997/98  -27.380  -1.67 
    
Jowett et al. (2003) also found that VHI reduced out-of-pocket payments, though there 
are some differences between their study and ours are worth noting: their survey was not 
nationally representative; VHI coverage was restricted to voluntary coverage (their data were 
collected in the city of Hai Phong that succeeded for a while in enrolling adults as well as school 
children in the voluntary scheme); out-of-pocket payment data were collected only from those 
reporting illness; and their results refer only to those reporting positive payments.  Trivedi (2003) 
found some evidence from the 1997/98 data of VHI increasing out-of-pocket expenditures
18, but 
the effect was not significant when commune fixed effects were included in the regression 
model.   
                                                 
17  The 1992/93 survey also asked about spending in the previous 4 weeks, but only of those reporting illness and only in respect 
of first visits to each provider type.   
18  Spending was defined in Trivedi’s analysis as spending over the past 4 weeks plus spending over the past 12 months.     18
VIII. NONMEDICAL CONSUMPTION  
VHI may also have an impact on nonmedical consumption by reducing the uncertainty 
associated with future medical expenses, encouraging households to reduce savings.   Some 
items of nonmedical consumption—such as food consumption, and expenditures on water and 
sanitation—may have effects on health outcomes, especially among children.   
We examine the impacts of VHI on aggregate per capita household nonmedical 
consumption, as well as its impact on various sub-aggregates of household consumption, 
including food consumption, and expenditures on electricity, water, garbage collection and 
water.  Aggregate consumption includes the imputed use value associated with ownership of 
consumer durables and other assets, and as is standard in LSMS surveys, consumption includes 
expenditures on services, as well as the value of home-produced food (Glewwe, Gragnolati and 
Zaman 2000).  The focus on per capita household consumption makes sense if households share 
resources, so that health insurance coverage of one household member reduces the financial risk 
faced by all household members.  Clearly, the risk faced by the household is reduced by more if 
several household members are insured, rather than just one member.  We therefore 
experimented with three different methods of health insurance coverage at the household level.  
The first was to classify a household as insured if every member is insured.  However, since less 
than 4% of households fall into this category, this approach was rejected.  The second was to 
define a household as insured if the majority of household members are insured.  The third was 
to define a household as insured if at least one member is insured.   
The double-difference results in Table 10 suggest that VHI coverage increases 
nonmedical consumption.  The impact is larger in the case where coverage is defined as the 
majority of members being covered than in the case where coverage is defined as one or more 
members being covered.  Whichever definition of coverage is used, the effect on nonmedical 
consumption is larger in absolute size than the effect on medical consumption (the latter is not 
significantly different from zero at the household level).  This result is not implausible.  A risk-
averse household without health insurance and without access to capital markets could quite 
reasonably set aside more than the expected value of per capita household medical outlays.  In 
1997/98, mean per capita household out-of-pocket spending on health care was equal to around 
100 (thousand dong), with a standard deviation of 305, and a maximum of 8500.  The 
nonmedical consumption effects in Table 10 are less than the mean plus one standard deviation.   
VHI has a bigger impact on non-food consumption than on food consumption, the latter effect in 
both specifications being significant only among the poorest quintile.  The different 
specifications yield somewhat different results for the individual components of aggregate 
consumption, though in both a significant impact on education expenditures emerges.  The 
1997/98 questionnaire explicitly asks that VHI premiums be excluded from education expenses, 
but it seems possible that this was not internalized by the enumerators.  The treatment effect for 
education expenditures among the subset of households with a child in school is broadly similar 
(59.33 and a z-stat of 3.09 in the case where a household is defined as being covered if it has a 
majority with health insurance), suggesting that the effect does not reflect health insurance 
picking up the effects of being in school.  Overall, the treatment effects suggest VHI may have 
had some positive impact on several items of household consumption that may have a beneficial 
effect on health, notably food consumption, garbage disposal and education expenditures, and 
investment in household durables.      19
Table 10: Double-difference estimates of VHI impact on components of  
per capita nonmedical household consumption 
 
Treatment 














        
Majority of household members insured        
Medical consumption  -28.898  -0.92  0.0847   
Nonmedical consumption  319.728  4.20  0.5848   
Food consumption  77.150  2.40  0.0002  Bottom 
Total nonfood consumption  179.103  3.61  0.8064   
Garbage collection expenditures  0.774  2.68  0.0108  Top 
Water expenditures  1.454  0.93  0.0837   
Electricity expenditures   5.490  1.34  0.6330   
Education expenditures   42.357  2.84  0.2874   
Imputed rent expenditures  3.030  0.19  0.4443   
Other non-food expenditures   29.791  0.87  0.9347   
Use value of durables  86.962  3.31  0.6749   
        
At least one household member insured        
Medical consumption  -34.793  -1.35  0.7917   
Nonmedical consumption  229.767  3.52  0.5973   
Food consumption  9.972  0.40  0.0000  Bottom 
Total nonfood consumption  175.541  3.64  0.4876   
Garbage collection expenditures  0.247  0.97  0.0001  Top 
Water expenditures  2.103  1.48  0.0000  Top 
Electricity expenditures   2.599  0.74  0.0000  Top 
Education expenditures   55.872  3.27  0.0000  4
th, Top 
Imputed rent expenditures  11.866  1.28  0.5324   
Other non-food expenditures   78.532  2.55  0.0412  Bottom 
Use value of durables  36.057  1.65  0.8604   
        
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The results in this paper lend support to recent research that argues that health insurance 
can improve health outcomes and can expand household consumption through the reduction of 
financial risk.  The use of panel data collected before and after the insurance program’s 
introduction allows us to eliminate any confounding effects due to selection on time-invariant 
unobservables, and our coupling of propensity score matching with a double-difference estimator 
allows us to reduce the risk of biases due to inappropriate specification of the outcome regression 
model.  The fact remains, however, that insurance was not assigned randomly, and there remains 
the possibility that people may have been selected into the program in part on the basis of time-
varying unobservables.  It is possible, in other words, that those in the program did not share the   20
same time trend in unobservables as those outside the program.   This is always a risk in a non-
experimental study, including quasi-experimental designs where insurance is rolled out at a 
different pace across geographic areas, rather than as here across different occupational groups.   
Subject to this caveat, our results suggest that Vietnam’s health insurance program 
impacted favorably on height-for-age and weight-for-age of young schoolchildren, with a 
treatment effect in the case of height-for-age that is not much smaller than that estimated for 
Mexico’s PROGRESA program (Behrman and Hoddinott 2000) and South Africa’s very 
generous old-age pension program (Case 2001).   Among adults too we also find a significant 
impact of VHI on our anthropometric outcome (BMI).  Our results suggest that among young 
children, VHI increases use of primary care facilities, and leads to a substitution away from the 
use of pharmacists as a source of advice and non-prescribed medicines toward the use of them as 
a supplier of medicines prescribed by a health professional.  Among older children an adults, 
VHI results in a marked increase in the use of hospital inpatient and outpatient departments.   
Our results also suggest that VHI causes a reduction in annual out-of-pocket expenditures 
on health, and an increase in nonmedical household consumption, including food consumption, 
and various items of non-food consumption, including education spending and investment in 
household durables.   Our estimate of the VHI-induced reduction in out-of-pocket health 
spending is considerably smaller than our estimate of the VHI-induced increase in nonmedical 
consumption.  This is consistent with the idea that households hold back their household 
consumption considerably if, through lack of health insurance, they are exposed to the risk of 
large out-of-pocket expenditures.  This is especially plausible in a country where at the time 
(1993), a single visit to a public hospital cost on average the equivalent of 20% of a person’s 
annual non-food consumption (World Bank et al. 2001).     21
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